

MODIFIED MODUS PONENS AND MODAL LOGIC

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This paper discusses an inference rule called by *modified modus ponens*, which is used in the logical system $LPC + Ch$ which is first order (or lower) predicate calculus equipped with additional axiomatization of *modifier operators*. This basic forms a system like generalized modal system with several pairs of modal operators.

The main properties of the system $LPC + Ch$ necessary for introducing this topic are considered. It suffices well a propositional system $PC + Ch$ for these purposes. The modal version of *modified modus ponens* is proved to hold in standard modal systems.

1. INTRODUCTION

First we give a short description of the *Ch-extension* of classical propositional logic PC . As an *alphabet* of our *Ch-language* we adopt the alphabet of classical propositional calculus choosing the connectives \neg standing for negation, \rightarrow standing for implication, as primitives, and connectives \vee standing for disjunction, \wedge standing for conjunction, and \leftrightarrow standing for equivalence are derived from those in the known way. We adopt the set of proposition letters $PR = \{p_i \mid i = 0, 1, \dots, n, \dots\}$ straight from PC . So, for $PC + Ch$ we get the logical alphabet from PC . We further need some added characters for formalizing a set of *characteristic operators*. The symbolic alphabet consists of a set of *modifier symbols* $\mathbf{0} = \{\mathfrak{F}, \mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \dots\}$ where the operators $\mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \dots$ are *substantiating* (abbreviated by $\mathfrak{F} \lesssim \mathcal{F}_i$) and \mathfrak{F} is an *identity operator*. We can denote these *modifier operators* by metavariables $\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{V}, \dots$ (with or without numerical subscripts). For any modifier $\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{0}$, we can form its *dual modifier* $\mathcal{F}^* = \neg\mathcal{F}\neg$, and the set of duals we symbolize by $\mathbf{0}^*$. For the identity operator \mathfrak{F} it holds $\mathfrak{F}^* = \mathfrak{F}$. Modifiers belonging to $\mathbf{0}^*$ are called *weakening operators* (abbreviated by $\mathcal{F}^* \lesssim \mathfrak{F}$).

The formation of well-formed formulae (wffs) is similar to that of PC . We give the definition of the set \mathbf{W} of wffs of $PC + Ch$ as follows:

Definition 1.1. \mathbf{W} is the set of wffs of $PC + Ch$ if

(1^o) the set W of wffs of PC is a subset of \mathbf{W} ;

(2^o) if $\alpha \in \mathbf{W}$ and $\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{0}$ then $\mathcal{F}(\alpha) \in \mathbf{W}$;

(3^o) if $\alpha \in \mathbf{W}$ then $\neg\alpha \in \mathbf{W}$;

(4^o) if $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbf{W}$ then $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \in \mathbf{W}$;

(5⁰) All the wffs are generated by the steps (1⁰) – (4⁰).

The formal semantics of $PC + Ch$ is given in Mattila [7], and we do not consider it here. Instead, we go straight to the axiomatization. In addition to the axiomatization of PC we need in our proof-theoretical system a *characteristic axiom schemata* governing the logical properties of the modifier operators.

Our axiomatization for our system $PC + Ch$ are as follows:

Axiom schemata of Ch .

(i) All the *tautologies* of PC are axioms.

(ii) If $\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{0} \cup \mathbf{0}^*$, and $\mathcal{H} \lesssim \mathcal{F}$ (\mathcal{H} is at most as strong as \mathcal{F}), then for all $\alpha \in \mathbf{W}$

$$\mathcal{F}(\alpha) \rightarrow \mathcal{H}(\alpha) \quad (\text{AxCh})$$

is an axiom.

(iii) For all wffs $\alpha \in \mathbf{W}$ and for the identity operator $\mathfrak{I} \in \mathbf{0}$

$$\mathfrak{I}(\alpha) \leftrightarrow \alpha \quad (\text{AxId})$$

is an axiom.

We also adopt the following **inference rules**:

Modus ponens:

$$\alpha \rightarrow \beta, \alpha \vdash \beta, \quad (\text{MP})$$

Modified modus ponens:

$$\alpha \rightarrow \beta, \mathcal{F}(\alpha) \vdash \mathcal{F}(\beta) \quad (\text{MMP})$$

where $\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{0}$ is an arbitrary operator.

Rule of Substantiation. For wffs $\alpha \in \mathbf{W}$ and all substantiating operators $\mathcal{F} \in \mathbf{0}$

$$\vdash \alpha \Rightarrow \vdash \mathcal{F}(\alpha) \quad (\text{RS})$$

So, a *Ch-system* is any non-empty set X , such that the tautologies of PC , (AxCh) and (AxId) are included in X , and X is closed under (MP), (MMP), and (RS).

In the sequel we need the following properties of $PC + Ch$, which are proved in Mattila [6], [7]. For any $P \in \mathbf{W}$,

$$\vdash \mathcal{F}(P) \rightarrow P \quad (\mathfrak{I} \lesssim \mathcal{F}) \quad (1.1)$$

$$\vdash P \rightarrow \mathcal{H}(P) \quad (\mathcal{H} \lesssim \mathfrak{I}) \quad (1.2)$$

Then we consider situations in which operators are associated with connected wffs. We have the following result:

If \mathcal{F} is a substantiating operator and $\mathcal{H} = \neg\mathcal{F}\neg$, and $P, Q \in \mathbf{W}$, then

$$\mathcal{F}(P \rightarrow Q) \vdash \mathcal{F}(P) \rightarrow \mathcal{F}(Q). \quad (1.3)$$

2. SOME SYNTACTICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN *Ch*- AND MODAL SYSTEMS

We consider first the system **T** giving its axioms and other rules and definitions we need (for details, see [1]). One useful way for axiomatizing modal systems is to build the system over *PC*, as usually is done. Thus the system **T** consists of the axioms for propositional logic and of the axioms basing on *necessity*,

$$\Box P \rightarrow P \quad (\text{TA1})$$

$$\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q) \quad (\text{TA2})$$

T contains also inference rule MP and so-called **Rule of Necessitation**:

$$\vdash P \implies \vdash \Box P \quad (\text{N})$$

The modal concept of *possibility*, is defined by the condition

$$\Diamond P \text{ =}_{df} \neg \Box \neg P \quad (\text{Def. } \Diamond)$$

for any wff P , i. e. possibility is the dual of necessity.

If we interpret the operators \mathcal{F} and \mathcal{H} to be the modal operators \Box standing for *necessity*, and \Diamond standing for *possibility* of alethic modal logic, respectively, and the system has only this dual pair of operators, we get a modal system which contains the modal system **T**. In the modal interpretation of modifier operators the identity operator \mathfrak{S} corresponds to modal operator '*actuality*' (abbreviated often by \bigcirc). The formal evidence for that is e. g. the equation $\bigcirc(P) \equiv \neg \bigcirc(\neg P)$ for all $P \in \mathbf{W}$.

The modal counterparts of (AxCh) in the system **T** is

$$\vdash \Box P \rightarrow \Diamond P \quad (\text{AxCh}''')$$

from which it follows the reflexivity laws by means of the actuality operator.

$$\vdash \Box P \rightarrow P \quad (2.1)$$

$$\vdash \Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond P \quad (2.2)$$

Thus in this modal interpretation (TA1) is equivalent to (1.1) operator \Box being substantiating. (TA2) follows directly from the modal counterpart of (1.3). Because MP belongs to the both systems and in *PC* + *Ch* substantiating operators have the same formal property than \Box in **T**, namely (N), we have showed that **T** belongs to the modal version *PC* + *Ch*. Clearly (2.1) implies both (2.2), and (AxCh'''), and also (2.2) implies both (2.1) and (AxCh''').

3. MODAL VERSION OF MODIFIED MODUS PONENS

There are also other standard modal systems like **S1**, **S2**, **S3**, **S4**, and **S5**, which are the most usual ones. The subsystem relations between these are **S1** \subset **S2** \subset **S3** \subset **S4** \subset **S5** and **S1** \subset **S2** \subset **T** \subset **S4** \subset **S5**. Thus **S3** is in a way alternative to the system **T**. It suffices to restrict our considerations to **S1**. The rule of Necessitation does not hold without restrictions in standard systems **S1**, **S2** and **S3** (see [1], p. 225, 230, and 235). The restricted form is

$$\vdash_{PC} \alpha \Rightarrow \vdash_{S1} \Box \alpha \quad (3.1)$$

For any wff α of *PC*. Axiom (TA2) of **T** is a theorem in **S1**. It is proved in Hughes and Cresswell [1] p. 225 and numbered by TS1.21. We need this result below. We now prove the following

Proposition 3.1. The modal version of the rule MMP holds in **S1**, i. e.

$$\vdash P \rightarrow Q, \vdash \mathcal{M}(P) \Rightarrow \vdash \mathcal{M}(Q) \quad (3.2)$$

where \mathcal{M} is a modal operator of **S1**.

Proof. Suppose $\vdash P \rightarrow Q$, and $\vdash \mathcal{M}(P)$ hold. It is remarkable that especially $\vdash_{PC} P \rightarrow Q$. For $\mathcal{M} = \Box$ we have the deduction.

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| 1. $P \rightarrow Q$ | given |
| 2. $\Box P$ | given |
| 3. $\Box(P \rightarrow Q)$ | appl. (3.1) to 1 |
| 4. $\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q)$ | TS1.21 in H. & C. |
| 5. $\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q$ | MP, 3,4 |
| 6. $\Box Q$ | MP, 2,5 |

For $\mathcal{M} = \Diamond$ we have the deduction

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------|
| 1. $P \rightarrow Q$ | given |
| 2. $\Diamond P$ | given |
| 3. $\neg \Diamond Q$ | premise |
| 4. $\Box \neg Q$ | $\Diamond Q = \neg \Box \neg Q$ |
| 5. $(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\neg Q \rightarrow \neg P)$ | LA3 |
| 6. $\neg Q \rightarrow \neg P$ | MP, 1,5 |
| 7. $\Box(\neg Q \rightarrow \neg P)$ | appl. (3.1) to 6 |
| 8. $\Box(\neg Q \rightarrow \neg P) \rightarrow (\Box \neg Q \rightarrow \Box \neg P)$ | TS2.21 in H. & C. |
| 9. $\Box \neg Q \rightarrow \Box \neg P$ | MP, 7,8 |
| 10. $\Box \neg P$ | MP, 4,9 |
| 11. $\neg \Diamond P$ | $\Diamond P = \neg \Box \neg P$ |
| 12. $\neg \Diamond P \wedge \Diamond P$ | A, 2,11 |
| 13. $\Diamond Q$ | PC, 3,12. |

□

From this result and from the subsystem relations it follows directly

Proposition 3.2. The modal version of the rule MMP holds in \mathbf{T} , i. e.

$$\vdash P \rightarrow Q, \vdash \mathcal{M}(P) \Rightarrow \vdash \mathcal{M}(Q) \quad (3.3)$$

Where \mathcal{M} is a modal operator of \mathbf{T} .

This can be also proved very easily without the knowledge of Proposition 3.1. Because \mathbf{T} is also a subsystem of Brouwerian system, the modal version of MMP holds also in it.

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